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Although neighboring
Arab states, notably Jordan, intervened on the Arab side, the Israelis
took control of and held about three-quarters of Palestine. The
remainder – the largely Arab-peopled area between Jerusalem and the
River Jordan commonly described today as the ‘West Bank’ – was
occupied by the Jordanian army. Since the Six Day War of 1967, in
which Israel defeated a combined force from several Arab countries,
the West Bank has been occupied by the Israelis; similar territorial
losses were suffered by the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza
Strip, and by the Syrians in the Golan Heights. Efforts to recover
these in the 1973 Yom Kippur War were repulsed by Israel.
Most of the Palestinian population were now stateless refugees driven
from their traditional lands. Many thousands ended up in squalid
refugee camps in Lebanon. Others sought out relatives in Jordan, over
half of whose population is of Palestinian descent. Others moved
further afield: as with the Jews, Palestinian communities with many of
the same attributes (a focus on education, business and professional
skills) have grown up throughout the world.
Politically, the main player in Palestinian politics since its
formation in 1964 has been the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), an umbrella grouping of seven main factions. For 40 years, the
leader of the largest faction, al-Fatah, was Yasser Arafat, a
charismatic and revolutionary figurehead. Known among Palestinians as
‘Abu Ammar’ (the builder), Arafat was the long-standing chair of the
PLO and, from 1994, head of the Palestinian Authority (see below). The
PLO and its affiliates embarked on an international campaign designed
to highlight the plight of the Palestinian peoples. This mixed
orthodox military operations with high profile urban guerrilla and
terrorist activities. Israel responded in kind, and the underground
war between the two has been uniquely unforgiving (apart from Arafat,
all the key founding members of the PLO were assassinated).
Arafat died in November 2004 in a Parisian hospital (where he had been
flown for medical treatment) of an undisclosed mystery condition
involving low blood platelets, resulting in him retreating into a coma
that rendered him multiple organ failure, a brain hemorrhage and,
finally, death. Aged 75, the Palestinians' pioneer had given no prior
warning of ill-health before his sudden slip into sickness. His death
caused widespread disbelief among the Palestinian people who had
thought their leader invincible for evading death on several famous
occasions, most notably in an airplane crash and from an attempted
assassination. However, fears that the Palestinian movement would
degenerate into chaos have so far proven unfounded, although there are
no signs that the Palestinians plan to relent their ongoing struggle
for reclamation of land and rights.
By the early 1980s, it was clear that their ‘armed struggle’ was of
limited value. Moreover, the political environment was fast changing.
In 1979, the largest Arab state, Egypt, signed the Camp David Accord.
The Accord included not only a peace treaty but provisions for the
return of occupied land to Egypt (which was effected) and for a
transition to autonomous rule for West Bank Palestinians (which was
never introduced). The attitude of the right-wing Israeli government
of Menachem Begin (and that of Yitzhak Shamir which followed) was
typified by the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.
The main purpose of the invasion was to destroy the PLO infrastructure
that had developed in the southern part of the country since the
1960s, as well as its headquarters in Beirut. In this it was
successful, but Israel then decided to maintain an occupation zone in
the southern part of the country jointly controlled by the Israeli
Defence Forces (IDF) and their local proxies, the South Lebanon Army.
Several indigenous guerrilla movements, notably Hezbollah, emerged and
fought a highly effective campaign of attrition against the Israelis
which led to Israel’s only military defeat when the IDF was forced to
pull out of Lebanon in 1999.
From 1987, Palestinian activists wound down the armed struggle in
favor of a more generalized campaign of civil disobedience, street
disturbances and strikes known under the collective rubric of al-intifada
(‘uprising’). This was allied with a diplomatic offensive by the
exiled PLO leadership (now based in Tunis) and endorsement of UN
resolutions 242 and 338, which implicitly recognize Israel’s right to
exist. The right-wing Israeli government of Yitzhak Shamir seemed
reluctant to reach a settlement and such dialog as occurred was
largely futile.
The 1991 war in Iraq seemed to offer an opportunity to break the
impasse. The Israeli government was persuaded by the Americans to stay
out of the fighting to keep the Arab members of the anti-Iraq
coalition, including Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, on side. But
diplomatic manoeuvring after the war returned to its usual snail’s
pace – in public at least. For at the same time, an exceedingly
discreet diplomatic initiative brokered by the Norwegian government
was making remarkable progress and had, by the end of the summer of
1993, brought an agreement between the Israelis and the PLO. The rest
of the world was presented with a virtual fait accompli. The
essence of the agreement, enshrined in a declaration of principles and
signed by Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the lawn of the White House in
September, was that the Israelis would relinquish control of the Gaza
strip and an area around the West Bank town of Jericho. This would
come under sole Palestinian control, governed by an elected
Palestinian administration. This was intended to be the first stage of
a process eventually extending throughout the occupied territories and
leading to a complete and comprehensive settlement by the end of 1998.
As president of the autonomous Palestinian administration, the
Palestinians elected the veteran Yasser Arafat – often referred to as
Abu Ammar (‘The Builder’).
In addition to Gaza and Jericho, the Palestinians took control of six
major towns. That is as far as the process went. Political cold feet
in Israel over the perennial issues of security, the status of
Jerusalem and the future of Jewish settlements on the West Bank left
the Palestinians with a disconnected patchwork of isolated pockets to
which access, supplies and services are all under Israeli control.
However, back in 1994/5, the deal also had important consequences for
Israel’s relations with its neighbors. Jordan concluded a peace treaty
with Israel during 1995 but Syria (upon whom the attitude of Lebanon
also depends) has proved more intractable. The Syrians insist on the
return of the Golan Heights, which the Israelis will find very
difficult.
The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by right-wing
Jewish fundamentalists sharply polarized the country and made the June
1996 election which followed especially fraught. The Likud leader,
Binyamin Netanyahu, won a marginal victory with a strong campaign
which negated much of the emotional effect of Rabin’s death. In May
1999, the electorate returned to Labor, now led by Ehud Barak, the
latest in the long Israeli tradition of soldier-politicians.
Among the first actions of the Barak government was to extricate
Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (see above). However he failed to
make any progress in resolving the outstanding issues with the
Palestinians whose frustration found expression in the second
intifada, which began in 2000. By the time Barak called a general
election – which was held in February 2001 and is the most recent to
date – Israeli forces and Palestinian police and guerrillas were
virtually at war. His opponent was the notoriously hawkish Ariel
Sharon, yet another ex-general who is especially disliked by
Palestinians for his complicity in the 1982 Sabra and Chatila
massacres. (Several thousand inhabitants, largely civilians, of these
two refugee camps in Lebanon were killed by Falangist paramilitaries.
Israeli forces were fully aware of the situation and able to
intervene, but did nothing.) Sharon was duly elected but his Likud
party failed to secure a majority in the Knesset. The Labor party
under the veteran politician Shimon Peres agreed to join a coalition
government.
Sharon was able to take advantage of a major political shift in
Israeli society since the 1990s. Two factors were at work. First was
the influx of several hundred thousand Russian Jews, taking advantage
of their birthright and keen to escape the deteriorating situation at
home. Second was the growing influence of orthodox Jewry within the
country, both fundamentalist and mainstream, which has gradually
produced a schism between the religious and secular in Israeli society
– what has become known as the ‘kulturkampf’ (literally,
‘culture war’) between the two.
Sharon was determined to reverse the Oslo-based process and emasculate
the Palestinian Authority through a combination of economic
strangulation and military action. He was fortunate in having the
strongly pro-Israeli Bush administration in the White House from the
beginning of 2001. For their part, the Palestinian population were
increasingly disillusioned with the Authority: although it was
operating in a uniquely difficult environment, it did itself little
favors through frequently inept management, nepotism and corruption.
Many Palestinians turned to the more disciplined, militant Islamic
movements such as Hamas and the younger generation of secular fighters
in groups such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The tactic of suicide
bombing was effective but indiscriminate and did nothing to promote
the Palestinians’ cause in the outside world. The Israeli response was
ever greater use of military force using its entire armory of
conventional weapons. (It also possesses a large arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction.) As ever, the greatest casualties were among the
civilian populations of both sides. By the end of 2002, the
Palestinian Authority had been all but destroyed.
The peace process seemed all but moribund. By virtue of their huge
financial support for Israel, the Americans are the only foreign
government with any influence over Sharon. Since 2001, they have made
various half-hearted attempts to revive negotiations – the latest of
which, termed the ‘road map’, has been stillborn. As such, Israel has
a free hand to implement its most recent plan, which is to build a
wall separating the Palestinian West Bank from the rest of Israel (the
Gaza Strip is already effectively cut off). Israeli settlement
activity on Palestinian land, illegal under international law,
continues apace. And since the withdrawal of the Labor party from the
coalition government in October 2002, Sharon faces no significant
domestic constraints. Likud has allied itself with a number of small
right-wing, ultra-orthodox parties who hold that Judea and Samaria –
the West Bank – are part of the land of Israel. The wall may buy the
Israelis a measure of security. For the Palestinians, the political
and economic outlook appears very bleak. However, as distressing as
the death of their leader, Yasser Arafat, has been, there is now the
possibility that this calamity may compel some sort of closure to the
lengthy conflict. The powers that were previously assigned to Arafat
were eventually apportioned to Mahmoud Abbas in a landslide victory in
January 2005.
It is hoped that the drama of recent events, and the demise of Arafat
- a figure viewed as abominable as some for failing to actively
address militant Palestinian groups - will restart the peace process.
Optimism, at last, seems to be evident: Sharon has welcomed the
appointment of Abbas, declaring his desire that Abbas will clamp down
on militant Palestinian groups. Abbas, in turn, has signalled that he
wishes to meet Sharon as soon as possible to conduct security talks.
Even George Bush Jnr, who notoriously refused to invite Arafat to
Washington, has now extended such an invite to Abbas. Despite such
leaked news of chaotic scenes where Israeli officials at some polling
stations were refusing to permit Palestinians the right to vote, the
staging of a democratic process to appoint Arafat's successor has been
viewed favorably. The world waits with bated breath to observe Abbas's
strategies and to see whether much-needed hope can finally be
administered to this troubled region.
In November 2005, a new twist in Israeli politics saw Sharon quitting
the Likud party which he had helped found in 1973. Frustrated by the
more right-wing Likud MPs' refusal to accept his ministerial nominees
and their disapproval of the forced removals of Jewish settlers from
the Gaza Strip, Sharon announced he would create a new center party,
bringing with him 14 members of Likud. The move was also thought to
have been precipitated by new Labor party leader Amir Peretz's
decision to pull out of the governing coalition. Sharon asked
President Moshe Katsav to dissolve parliament and call an early
election, which is expected to take place on 28 March 2006. Whether
Sharon's gamble pays off remains to be seen. |
